A vituperative and highly damaging speech at Mujahid Manzil on July 10, 1953 set the tone and tenor of Sheikh Abdullah's future relationship with India. It was as if Sheikh was openly baiting India and Nehru. As he set his reticle on the target to click, muscle memory and skills became reflex, and he was ready to take a cold shot. Nehru and India were obvious targets. He spewed venom - I feel sorry that I have not come across a single person in India who could assure me that relations between the state and Centre based on the Instrument of Accession would continue as such in future. If certain leaders opposed the Praja Parishad (fronted by Hindu organisations which had harried and harangued Abdullah in Jammu division) agitation, they did so, because they did not agree with the method of the agitation. They agreed with its objectives. (Sheikh suspected that Maharaja Hari Singh had for most part backed the Praja Parishad in its early days after the accession). None of the leaders in India supported the present basis of relations between India and Kashmir.
Sheikh's seditious speech paved the way for his arrest a couple of months later. Pakistan PM Mohd Ali Bogra had met PM Nehru the same month in London on the sidelines of the Commonwealth summit. To reconcile the different interpretations and the deadlock emerging thereof from the UNCIP resolutions, the two decided that Nehru would visit Karachi in July. But in an historic visit to Pakistan between July 25 and 27, Nehru hardly spoke about Kashmir. Events in Jammu and as a consequence Abdullah's dismissal and incarceration did not allow this process to be carried out according to its time table. Though Nehru and Bogra met again on August 16, and the joint communique decided that a Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by April 1954, this was the only real gain that accrued from these meetings.
Pakistan being Pakistan played its Janus faced duplicitous games, ruling milieu wanted to appropriate vital concessions by methods of war and dialogue and in a strange anomaly whenever negotiations opened between the two nations for some sort of a settlement of the festering dispute, a virulent campaign against India was initiated by Pakistan. As the big powers pushed for Admiral Chester Nimitz's appointment as Plebiscite Administrator, Nehru was completely opposed to this move. A Fleet Admiral of the US Navy, Nimitz was C in C US Pacific Fleet leading them to victory over Japan.
With the help of certain secret and confidential documentation, some hitherto never put out in public domain, my narrative will show how both Pakistan and India had ratcheted up their diplomatic offensives to counter one another during those delicate days of nerve wracking parleys. Firstly, I am putting out a top secret telegram sent by the Indian Embassy in Washington to Delhi giving them a heads up on how Admiral Nimitz had already begun making tracks. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai dashed off the telegram:
Telegram Top Secret.
To………..Foreign, New Delhi
D.T.R. “ 261930
No. 267 Top Secret. For Bajpai From Sen.
1 Admiral By ch. NIMITZ arrived in Washington today and I paid a courtesy call on him at the State Department where he has been allotted temporary office and assistance of the South Asian Division Staff. I was accompanied by Brigadier Chaudhri. RAY THURSTON who has been dealing with Kashmir Affairs in State Department throughout has been assigned the task of briefing Admiral NIMITZ.
2 RAY THURSTON and JOSEPH SPARKS of State Department were present during meeting. OI made it clear to NIMITZ that my visit was purely a courtesy call but I would be glad to secure any information that he may by trans require in advance or any facilities that may be desired during his TRANSIT and stay in India. NIMITZ was extremely cordial and made some general remarks on his new appointment. He was anxious to know in particular whether there might be some delay in the truce arrangements being carried through in time for plebiscite to be completed by 1st November. I stated that I was NOT (repeat NOT) sufficiently familiar with the recent developments but I would be glad to secure information* for him. RAY THURSTON enquired whether existing electoral rolls could be used for plebiscite and cited the precedent of the Referendum held in N.W.F.P. in 1947. I promised to let him have the information on this point as soon as possible.
3 Admiral NIMITZ appeared to be anxious to get on with the job. His present thinking, presumably based on briefs of State Department, is to expedite plebiscite with least possible delay. He said that complications may arise in case truce was protracted.
4 Grateful if you will kindly instruct on points raised by THRSTON and also any other information that you may feel might be of interest to the Admiral* at this stage.
5 I understand Pakistan Embassy officials paid a courtesy call on the Admiral as well, but the point regarding electoral roll was NOT discussed.
PPS to PM : PS to PM : APS to PM(3) Dy Minister SG FS: Addl. Secy: D.H.I. JSN JSC (4) PS to SG (@) & PS to FS.
Nehru who was equidistant from the Cold War powers and walked the path of non alignment like a Colossus wanted a neutral to be the Plebiscite Administrator. He did not want the big powers bullying him over Kashmir given that he had already succumbed erroneously to Lord Mountbatten's advice to take Kashmir to the United Nations. As such it is important to understand the role of the P.A against this backdrop:
Plebiscite Administrator – His appointment and functions.
1 According to paragraph B.3(a) of the Plebiscite proposals the Plebiscite Administrator will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, but they are silent in regard to the date from which he should be so appointed. In his discussions with the Representative of the Commission Dr. Lozano on the 20th December, 1948, the Prime Minister of India made it clear that “the Government of India, however, would regard the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator, as such, premature until Parts I and II of the Resolution of 13th August had been implemented”, vide paragraph 3 of the Aide Memoire No.I.
2 Paragraph 10 of the Proposal runs “Upon the signature of the Truce Agreement the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part II of the Commission’s Resolution of the 13th August, 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations”. In other words, he should be appointed in time to be associated with the discussions envisaged in paragraph 10 of the proposals. The stage at which these discussions should be held were discussed by the Prime Minister with Dr. Lozano and Monsiur M. Colban on the 22nd December, 1948, and according to Aide Memoire II which records the gist of the discussions “he (Dr Lozano) and Monsiur M.Colban agreed that the consultations envisaged in B.10 cold take place only after the Commission was satisfied that satisfactory progress had been made with the implementation of Part II of the Resolution, that is, after the hostile tribesmen, Pakistan Forces and Pakistan Nationals who had entered Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of fighting had withdrawn from State territory. Dr. Lozano said that this was the interpretation of B.10 which they would present to the Pakistan Government in Karachi”. (In the printed document the reference is to B.9 which is obviously a mistake. The correct reference should be to B.10). Vide paragraph 3 of the Aide Memoire II. In other words, the consultations will not and cannot begin immediately on the signature of the Truce Agreement. Consequently, the formal appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator need not be made immediately on the signature of the Truce Agreement. It should be made in time for him to be associated for the consultations envisaged in the proposals.
Till his formal appointment is notified by the Jammu and Kashmir Government his status will be that of the Plebiscite Administrator-designate and any exploratory work which he may do will be in the capacity of an adviser to the Commission, as pointed out by the Prime Minister of India in his discussions with Dr. Lozano on the 20th December, vide paragraph 3 of the Aide Memoire I.
The question of the date of his appointment is raised here because we should be clear about his status when he visits the country even before his formal appointment is made. If the Plebiscite Administrator is formally appointed immediately, it is likely that an impression may gain ground that he has entered upon his duties and attempts may be made to refer to him matters often unconnected with his duties. Even if he were not to take note of these representations, as indeed he cannot, this state of affairs will produce unfortunate results. It is, therefore, important that his appointment should be notified only when it becomes necessary to do so, and till then his status should be that Plebiscite Administrator-designate. He is naturally welcome to visit the State for purposes of the exploratory work referred to in paragraph 3 of the Aide Memoire I, but these consultations should be with the Government. He should not get into touch with individuals or parties in the State without reference to the State Government. The point to be emphasized here is that it should be clear that he is not a sort of parallel or over-riding authority. It is not suggested that he will act as such but there should be no misapprehension in the minds of public about his status and role.
3 His functions, according to the proposals are limited to organizing the plebiscite and ensuring its freedom and impartiality. Certain questions require clarifications in regard to this :
Appointment of a staff of Assistants and Observers.
Probably the staff will consist partly of outsiders and partly of the nationals of the State. In regard to the second category the State Government desire that they should be consulted whenever he proposes to appoint a national of the State. The State Government will naturally do their best to assist him in all possible ways, but it is necessary to ensure that the appointment of local people does not create any complications. This should apply both to officials and non-officials. There are naturally some people, both in Services and outside, who are dissatisfied with the present regime for one reason or the other or who may desire that the State should accede to Pakistan. Their appointment on the staff will create difficulties in the smooth working of the Plebiscite administration. In regard to officials the State Government will have to look to their own administrative requirements also. If the salaries and emoluments offered by the Plebiscite Administrator are disproportionately high there may be a natural tendency to seek employment under him, and this would create difficulties for the State Government which they are anxious to avoid.
Paragraph 7 of the Plebiscite proposals refers to freedom of political activity and movement. Here again, the State Government would do their best to co-operate with the Administrator in ensuring that legitimate political activity is given free play, but there is always a border line between political activity and activity of a subversive nature. In regard to this, the State Government may have to take firm action and it is quite likely that representations will be made to the Plebiscite Administrator by interested parties. The procedure which the State Government would suggest would be that the Plebiscite Administrator should take up such cases with the State Government. He should not initiate any inquiries of his own or do anything which would indicate that he is a sort of a parallel or –over-riding authority.
Paragraph 7(c ) relates to the release of political prisoners. We have already stated in the Aide Memoire that “persons guilty of ordinary offences against the law will not be regarded as political prisoners”, vide paragraph 4 of Aide Memoire No.1. It may be necessary to have a more detailed definition. Clearly the expression “Political Prisoners” must exclude all persons who were convicted of violence or attempts at violence under the laws in force before the emergency occurred or under laws enacted after the commencement of the emergency. Persons convicted of offences involving violence or of an attempt to organize a violent overthrow of Government or conspiracy against the Government cannot be regarded as indulging in legitimate political activity. The question si important because the Commission seems to be interested in the case of 13 persons who, among others, are now being tried for offences under the Explosive Substance Act, conspiracy to overthrow Government – both laws being part of the normal legal system of the State – and under the Enemy Agents Ordinance – a law enacted during the emergency for the protection of the State.
Sd/- Ghulam Mohd Bakshi
Five years later, Nehru vehemently opposed Admiral Nimitz's name for the same reason. Now more so because the situation was even more delicate in Kashmir given its tallest leader Sheikh Abdullah had been imprisoned.
COMMISSION FOR INDIA
11 March 1949.
1 The prospects of the early conclusion of the Truce Agreement between the Government of India and Pakistan have no doubt suggested to you the desirability of focusing attention in the near future on certain problems which will arise in preparing for the plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
2 Important among these, in the opinion of the Commission, is the problem of the return of citizens of the State, who have left it on account of the disturbances. Under the Resolution of the Commission of 5 January 1949 as accepted by both Governments, these persons “will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commission shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator”.
3 The problem is, of course, essentially one for the two Governments in conjunction with the Plebiscite Administrator. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that
The repatriation of those citizens who wish to return is likely to extend over a period of time and in view of the desire of the two Governments to expedite in all ways the holding of the plebiscite, the Commission ventures to recommend to both Governments the early establishment of the two Commissions envisaged in its resolution. In our opinion these Commissions could profitably undertake a considerable amount of preparatory work in advance of the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator.
4 The Commission would be grateful if your Government would inform it, for the benefit of the Plebiscite Administrator, of such plans or programs as may have been worked out for the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees. In the course of the consideration of these problems a considerable amount of data may have been gathered on the present location of the refugees, their condition, their original homes within the State, methods of identification and similar matters. Such information will, of course, be of greatest value to the Plebiscite Administrator in connection with his task of assisting in their return and of arranging for the plebiscite. The Commission would appreciate receiving a copy of such data as have been or may be prepared on these matters.
Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.
Sd/- Carlos A.Leguizamon
Sir Girja S. Bajpai
Secretary General, Govt. of India,
COMMISSION FOR INDIA
14 March 1949.
Dear Sir Girja,
1 The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan has read with interest your letter of 10 March 1949 in which you state the views of the Government of India with respect to certain proposals contained in the statement presented by the Pakistan Delegation during the meeting of the Commission’s Truce Sub-Committee on 9 March 1949.
2 The question of a balance of military forces is one which the Pakistan Government raised in the discussions with the Commission during the consideration of the Resolution of 13 August and of the proposals of 11 December 1948. In the course of the conversations last August the Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan that in its view a “military balance” would exist in the State of Jammu& Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the Resolution of 13 August did not call for the disarming or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces, which the Commission understood to number approximately 35 battalions. The Commission, however, cannot accept the interpretation that “the declared objective of the truce arrangement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side….”. there can be no other objective of the truce arrangements than to establish peaceful and normal conditions throughout the State such as will be conducive to the organization and holding of a plebiscite. Similarly, the process of synchronizing the withdrawal of the Pakistan and Indian forces to be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission, in effect tends to create a corresponding situation on either side as withdrawal of one and reduction of the other take place, but in no way does this affect the ultimate aims of the Resolution of 13 August and the principles embodies in that of 5 January.
3 With reference to your observations relating to the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the State, the Commission’s Resolution of 13 August 1948 does not make their withdrawal conditional upon other developments in the area to be evacuated by them.
4 The Commission observes that in paragraph 2 of your letter you state that the withdrawal of Indian forces will begin “only after the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals, referred to in A.2 of Part II of the Resolution have withdrawn and also the bulk of the Pakistan forces”. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in this connection the Commission wishes to refer to B.1 of part II of its Resolution of 13 August under the terms of which the Government of India has agreed to being with the withdrawal of the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission when the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that Tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A.2 have withdrawn and that Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State.
5 The Commission is gratified to note the readiness of the Government of India to discuss the question of the formation of a civil armed force in the Azad Kashmir territory as well as the question of the phasing of the withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir. It is hoped that the Government of India will present its comprehensive views on these and other points relating to the implementation of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948 during the forthcoming meetings of the Commission and its Truce Sub-Committee.
6 A copy of your letter and of my present reply is being forwarded to the Pakistan Government.
Sd/ Carlos A.Leguizamon
Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai,
Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations,
Government of India.
D.O.no.1-KS New Delhi
March 16, 1949.
My dear HM,
You have got a copy of the memorandum presented by the Pakistan Delegation to the Truce Sub-Committee of the UNCIP and of a letter addressed by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai to the Chairman repudiating the idea of a ‘military balance’ during the period of the truce. A copy of the reply received today from the Chairman of the UNCIP is enclosed. It is proposed to discuss this matter at a meeting of the Secretariat Advisory Committee for Kashmir Affairs to be held at 9.15 a.m. on Thursday, March 17, 1949, in Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai’s room. The points for consideration appears to be :
(a) What line should be pursued regarding the disbanding and disarming of Azad Forces during the period the period of the truce.
(b) Whether simultaneously with our reply on the point of disarming and disbanding of Azad Forces we should indicate to the Commission provisions to be made in the truce agreement about : :-
(i) The administration and occupation of the mountainous territory to the north of Burzil;
(ii) The return of kidnapped persons;
(iii) The disposal of converted Hindus and Sikhs at present held in Azad territory;
(iv) The law to be applied to Azad territory during the period of the truce and later;
(v) The checks to be employed on the ingress and egress of persons into an from the Jammu & Kashmir territory in our possession and, that in the possession of Azad forces;
(vi) The constitution, control and numbers of the police force for Azad territory;
(vii) The selection of local authorities in Azad territory;
(viii) The removal of Pakistan officials from Azad territory;
(ix) The obligations resulting from paragraph B(3) of the Resolution of Agusut 13, 1948 and
(x) The policing of the border to prevent unauthorized ingress.
2 Enclosed also is a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the UNCIP regarding a Plebiscite Commission. This will also be discussed.
H.M.Patel, Esquire, ICS,
Secretary, Ministry of Defence.
Copy forwarded for information to:-
1 Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General, E.A. & C.R. Ministry.
2 Mr V.P.Menon, Adviser, Ministry of States.
3 Mr D.Kachru, Private Secretary to Hon’ble Prime Minister.
SECRET MINISTRY OF STATES IMMEDIATE
1 I have attempted to put together in the enclosed draft the sort of points which the truce agreement should cover. I should be grateful for comments and criticism.
2 Four points, namely, the disarming and disbanding of ‘Azad’ forces, the phasing of the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, reduction in our own troops, arrangements for the policing of ‘Azad’ territory, and the claim to the mountainous territory to the north of Kashmir (excluding Gilgit) are being covered in a separate memorandum which it is proposed to present to the commission first. My object in circulating the draft is to make sure that when the points in the memorandum mentioned above have been cleared, we are ready with all the other points which need to be settled at the truce agreement stage.
Sd/- (Vishnu Sahay)
Secretary for Kashmir Affairs
-Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General. E.A.&C.R.
-Major General Kalwant Singh, Chief of General Staff, AHQ
-Mr. H.M.Patel, ICS, Secretary, Ministry of Defence
-Mr.V.Shankar, Private Secretary to Minister of States
-Mr. D.Kachru, Private Secretary to H.P.M.(2 copies)
-Ministry of States u.o.no.1-KS dated 22.3.49
THE TRUCE AGREEMENT
1 Neither party will advance during the period of the truce beyond the truce line demarcated on the attached map.
2 The Pakistan Government will use its best endeavour to secure the immediate withdrawal from the State of all tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3 During the period of the truce no tribesmen or Pakistan nationals who are not normal resident of the State, will enter it, without written authority from a representative of the Commission, which will be given only if the visit is for a lawful purpose.
4 The Pakistan Government will withdraw all “Azad” forces from forward areas and will arrange their disbandment and disarming in stages to be described in a later paragraph.
5 Pakistan troops will begin withdrawal from the State within a week of the signing of this agreement. The withdrawal will be completed in the following stages.
At present the strength of the Pakistan forces in the State is………
Within one month of the signing of the agreement this will be reduced to…………………..
By the end of the two months after the signing of the agreement no Pakistan troops will be left within the State.
6 The term ‘forces or troops’ above covers all ancillary forces such as……
7 No arms, equipment or stores will be left behind by these forces.
8 When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in paragraph 2 above have withdrawn and further that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn in the stages mentioned in paragraph 5 above, the government of India will start withdrawing its forces in the following stages.
9 The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of Jammu & Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and all human and political rights are guaranteed.
10 For the policing of ‘Azad’ territory, a police force not exceeding…….., of whom………..may be armed, will be raised under the authority of the NCIP. Of this force half may be local Muslim residents and the other half will be non-Muslims. The officers will be U.N. nominees who may not be nationals of Pakistan or local Azad men.
11 Each party will be responsible for removing the mines it laid.
12 Till the time when Pakistan forces and Azad forces have withdrawn from forward positions, the land held between the opposite demarcation lines shall be treated as no man’s land, into which no military forces will move and into which civilians may move only after the concurrence of a U.N.O. observer has been obtained.
13 Ingress to and egress from the areas held by the Jammu & Kashmir Government and by “Azad forces” may be regulated by the Jammu & Kashmir govt. in one case and by “local authorities” in the other pending the establishment of check posts by Plebiscite Administrator when the latter will arrange that only bona fide persons are allowed to go in or move out.
14 All kidnapped persons shall be returned before a plebiscite can begin.
15 Persons converted since October 1947 held in Azad territory shall be entitled to come to Indian territory pending the establishment of conditions in which a plebiscite may be held and when they will be able to go back to their homes.
16 No party shall, during the period of the truce, indulge in propaganda appealing to religious or communal passion.
17 Local authorities may be appointed by the Commission for the administration of ‘Azad’ territory. They will not be Pakistan nationals, nor will they derive any authority from the so-called Azad Government.
18 The law applicable to “Azad territory” will be the laws of the Jammu & Kashmir government.
19 The use of the following roads will be permitted for the sending of supplies to refugees.
20 The disbanding and disarming of Azad forces will take place in the following stages:--
21 All prisoners of war will be forthwith released and handed over.
28 April 1949
TRUCE TERMS TRANSMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN BY THE COMMISSION.
1. CEASE-FIRE LINE.
A. The cease-fire line will be the line fixed by the Commission and, except as noted below, traced in yellow on the map annexed, and based upon the factual positions occupied on 1 January 1949 by the forces under the control of the Indian and Pakistan High commands. Based also upon the same factual considerations, the line between CHAKHOTI and TITHWAL and from CHORWAN to the north of DRAS, shall be demarcated as soon as possible by the Military Adviser of the Commission. The cease-fire line shall eliminate all no-man’s lands and shall be demarcated on the ground by agreement between the respective local Commanders, assisted by the Commission’s Military Observers. The line shall, to the greatest extent possible, follow easily recognizable features on the ground.
B. The Commission’s Military Adviser shall decide, without appeal, local adjustments of the cease-fire line in cases where no agreement is reached between the local Commanders.
C. The Commission will have Observers stationed where it deems necessary throughout the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
D. Observers will advise the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator regarding developments in the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the north. Without prejudice to the provisions of point 8 of the Resolution of 5 January 1949, should the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator conclude upon advice from the Observers, or upon reports from the Government of India that it is necessary for the defence of the area, the Commission and /or the Plebiscite Administrator may request the Government of India to post garrisons at specified points.
II. WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS.
A. The Government of Pakistan agrees :
1. To withdraw its troops from the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in seven weeks as follows :
(a) During the first three weeks twenty Infantry Battalions, plus the corresponding proportion of artillery and Supporting nits.
(b) During the following fortnight the remainder of the Pakistan troops, with the exception of eight Infantry Battalions.
(c) By the end of the seventh week, all Pakistan troops, including their ammunition, stores, and material will have left the territory of the State.
2. That, having secured the withdrawal of the tribesmen from the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it shall secure the withdrawal of Pakistan nationals still in the territory of the State and not normally resident theirein, who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
B. The Government of India agrees :
1. To withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir in stages submitted by the Commission for the agreement of the Government of India. The withdrawal ill begin as soon as the Commission shall have notified the government of India that the tribesmen, and Pakistan nationals, not normally resident in Jammu and Kashmir territory who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, have withdrawn, and that the Pakistan troops are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. That the schedule of the withdrawal of Indian forces will be made public by the Commission with the schedule of the withdrawal of Pakistan forces immediately after the acceptance of these terms by both Governments.
C. The operations mentioned in the above paragraphs A and B will be carried out under the surveillance of the Commission through its Military Adviser.
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
A. The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
B. Immediately upon the acceptance of these terms , the Commission will enter into consultations with the Government of India regarding the disposal of the Indian and State armed forces, and with the local authorities regarding the disposal of the armed forces in the territory to be evacuated by Pakistan troops, with a view to initiating implementation of point 4(a), and (b) of the Commission’s Resolution of 5 January 1949,
C. If, before the expiration of the seven weeks contemplated in point 11.A. decisions are reached in the consultations for the initial implementation referred to in III.B. above, the schedule of withdrawal of the Pakistan army, as provided for in 11.A. above, ma be extended to three months, in order to facilitate the implementation of decisions relating to point 4(b) of the Commission’s Resolution of 5 January 1949.
D. All prisoners of war will be released within one month.
E. All land mines will be immediately lifted by the side which sowed them,.
F. It will be made publicly known throughout the State of Jammu and Kashmir that peace, law, and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.
G. These terms are without prejudice to the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the State of Jammu a nd Kashmir.
H. These terms do not prejudice the functions and powers of the Plebiscite Administrator.
These terms will become effective and will be published by the Commission immediately upon their acceptance by both Governments.
I have arranged the communiques and missives in an order for readers to understand the gravity and enormity of the state of play as it existed then. Even as Nehru resisted the process of the appointment of Admiral Chester Nimitz by US in conjunction with Pakistan, a door opened and he managed to get his foot in it. Pakistan signed a treaty of military assistance with the US in May 1954. After stalling for years, he struck. As a wave of indignation and protest swept India, Nehru reneged. It is said that 27 letters and telegrams were exchanged between August 10, 1953 and September 21, 1954. Once the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, all bets were off as far as Nehru was concerned.