Kashmir Files: Indian Manoeuvres
Indian policy mavens were alive at every step in the triangular India-Pakistan-UN dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Every inch of territory was prized for its strategic construct, so the width and depth of negotiations was tough and unrelenting.

Sticking to the knitting was at the very kernel of the strategy employed by Indian policy mavens overseeing Kashmir affairs in the first flush of the border invasion after the state's accession to the Union of India. While three way letter wars remained the touch stone of the arguments and stated positions used by Indian, Pakistan and UNCIP officials, the volume of secret and confidential internal documentation within the Indian security apparatus was also on the heavier side. No quarter was given, nor was one asked for, in what was a bitter recriminatory environment bereft of trust or mutual agreement. It was bureaucratic eyeballing of a kind that doesn't exist even today when the same problems continue to manifest themselves. The underlying credo remained suspicion and wariness. An obsessive Mohd Ali Jinnah operated with single mindedness of purpose and focus — Kashmir as a Muslim majority state contiguous to Pakistan will opt for theocracy over democracy. An equally obdurate Maharaja, in this case the Hindu Hari Singh, checkmated him for he flirted with the idea of remaining independent of both Dominions. And then there was the game changer, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah who chose Nehru's freedom over Jinnah's tyranny. Between these two,  and Nehru's all consuming passion to retain Kashmir as a shop window for his brand of secularism, Jinnah was stopped in his tracks.

Jinnah's playlist was such that he even dispatched his military secretary Colonel William Birnie to engage with Hari Singh conveying to him that he would like to convalesce in the Valley after pouching Kashmir, given that Kashmir would opt for Pakistan. The sub continent's best kept secret that Jinnah was dying was still not out of the closet. As the tribal Lashkars ran riot down the

Muzaffarabad road to attack Srinagar, tension mounted in the Valley and Hari Singh stampeded. India's new government formed a three member team to drill some sense into Hari Singh who continued to vacillate. Colonel Sam Maneckshaw, Field Marshal Auchinleck and VP Menon were the troika with the Kashmir remit. Auchinleck was to talk to Hari Singh. Finally, the accession was signed on October 26, 1947.

On their return, Colonel Sam Maneckshaw was called into the Cabinet Meeting to give his assessment on ground zero. Let Maneckshaw himself take up the narrative:

At the morning meeting he handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, “Come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?” I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in

troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn’t fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport.”

As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God Almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, “Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away? He (Nehru) said, Of course, I want Kashmir (emphasis in original). Then he (Patel) said, “Please give your orders.” And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, “You have got your orders.” I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o’clock or 12 o’clock. I think it was the Sikh Regiment under Ranjit Rai that was the first lot to be flown in. And then we continued flying troops in. That is all I know about what happened. Then all the fighting took place. I became a Brigadier, and became Director of Military Operations and also if you will see the first signal to be signed ordering the cease-fire on 01 January (1949) had been signed by Colonel Manekshaw on behalf of C-in-C India, General Sir Roy Bucher. That must be lying in the Military Operations Directorate.

If repelling the Lashkar invasion was one part of the drama, the real state of play — a veritable maelstrom — began once Nehru invoked UN erroneously at the behest of Lord Mountbatten.  It is another matter that Nehru and Abdullah fell out quite rapidly because of various reasons, in the main due to Abdullah pursuing his favourite hobby horses — Maharaja Hari Singh's abdication and more autonomy; the continuous and unrelenting pressure from Praja Parishad and the clarion call given by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee which added to the meltdown: Ek desh -Do Vidhan, Do Pradhan, Do Nishan - Nahin Chal Sakta. The administration failed and the Hindu Jammu and Muslim Valley divide became deeper and wider with the passing of each day. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee died mysteriously in a Kashmir jail. Finally, malevolent anti India speeches by Abdullah led to his arrest, ending Chapter 1 of Kashmir's miserable history. B N Mallick, DIB at the time highlights the situational construct in his book My Days With Nehru:

“Then suddenly to our utter surprise Pandit Nehru started talking bitterly against Sheikh Abdullah’s communalism. He traced the Sheikh’s history from 1930 onwards and mentioned how he had started his career with the Muslim Conference, which was an out and out communal organisation. He said that as a result of pressures from outside and also seeing the development of the People’s Movement in the rest of India and for purely tactical reasons and probably under the advice of some of his more liberal followers, the Sheikh had converted the Muslim Conference into the Political Conference to give it a non-communal appearance. At this time Pandit Nehru suddenly looked at me and enquired whether I had come across some information of possible British connivance in that movement. I replied in the affirmative. He continued his talk against the Sheikh and mentioned all his communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the Muslim population in the valley. But, as soon as he became the Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his anti-Hindu activities. In contrast, he praised Bakshi and Sadiq for their completely non-communal outlook and said that these two were really secular-minded persons who required all support from India. Pt. Nehru said that all trouble in Kashmir was due to the Sheikh’s communal outlook and it was he who was not allowing the state to settle down to peace and stability. The Sheikh always talked about the rights of the Muslims, forgetting that the Hindus also formed nearly 35 per cent of the population of the state and he never showed any consideration for them. Pt. Nehru mentioned that politically he and other Indian leaders had to go along with the Sheikh for a considerable period and they had also helped him and played him up hoping that by coming in contact with secular India, where Muslims and Hindus and persons of all other denominations were living together and enjoying a peaceful life Sheikh Abdullah would be able to get rid of his communalism. But communalism was a disease with him and he could never get rid of it and his entire outlook and behaviour were based on the fact that Kashmir valley had a Muslim majority. Therefore, he was not at all surprised that the Sheikh had conspired with Pakistan to overthrow the non-communal and secular Government of Bakshi and Sadiq. What Pt. Nehru said was factually correct and was similar to what Sardar Patel had stressed to me in 1949. At the end he wished G.S. Pathak success and concluded by saying that he himself was allergic to these protracted political trials and he suggested that every effort should be made to expedite it.”

Here is the treatise pieced and laced together with the help of top secret communiqués and missives, many of them hitherto unpublished to build the narrative of the eyeballing. It showed how Indian policy makers were alive to the twists and turns as Pakistan played its devious games. The quick back and forths showing the gravity of the problem:

Brief Summary of Secretary-General’s note regarding conversations with UNCIP held on 11th April, 1949.



(a)  Up to Tithwal –

The Government of India agree to this part of the line being fixed by agreement between Local Commanders.

In the event of disagreement the Government of India agree to consider the advisability or otherwise of allowing General Delvoie to arbitrate.

(b) Beyond Tithwal to the north and east –

(i) The Government of India agree in principle to hold points (garrison) which were necessary for the purpose of protecting territories held by us especially in the Valley and for the command of the trade routes.

(ii) Administration in and around the points held by us would naturally be under our control. We would not insist upon a continuous line.


Regarding this we maintain our original stand, i.e. these forces must be disbanded and disarmed.

The UNCIP stated that Mr. Symonds (Commission’s Secretariat) brought back the view point of Pakistan regarding this matter. Pakistan felt that the Commission had given them an assurance that there would be no insistence on the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces during the truce period.

The Government of India could not accept this view and the Commission were informed that the Government of India could not accept a longer period, i.e. not more than three months, as suggested by the Commission for the disbandment of the Azad Forces.


The Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000 being raised for the maintenance of law and order. Half of this force to be armed like a Police Force and the other half to be kept unarmed. Half to be recruited from the followers of Azad Kashmir and half from persons normally resident in this are but not the followers of Azad Kashmir. No Pakistan officer should after the truce period of three months be associated with this force which should be officered by the UN personnel and by locals.

The Commission presenting the point of view of Pakistan said that Pakistan had asked for raising a force of larger strength than that suggested by India, the main grounds being the suspicion that India might violate the truce line.


No progress was made about this matter. It was talked about in general terms.

5. The Commission further asked if the Kishanganga river should be left open to navigation for both sides for the transport of supplies etc. Our representatives promised to refer the point to their Government.




1. Should we agree to adjudication by the Military Adviser of the Commission on points of dispute over the line up to Keran?

2. Should we agree to the free navigational use of the Kishanganga river between Keran and Tithwal?


The following stations in the Frontier Illaqas have been suggested where garrisons of the Indian Army should be stationed :




Burzil Pass,

Rattu Cantt,





Gol, Marol and


On 12.4.1949


Two points were raised by Dr. Lozano and Mr Leguizamon at their meeting with us on the 11th April on which we have to give them a reply. These are: --

(i) As regards the line up to Keran; Should we agree to adjudication by the Military Adivser of the Commission on the points of dispute?

(ii) Should we agree to the free navigational use of the Kishan Ganga between Keran and Tithwal?

2. As regards (i) the question as to whether we should allow a third party to adjudicate depends, in my opinion, very much on what the settlement on the other points of the Truce Agreement is. As regards (ii) we have to obtain the advice of the Jammu and Kashmir Government first. Could you kindly telephone for it and let us know.

Sd/- (Vishnu Sahay)


P.S.to H.P.M. (Mr Kachru)

Ministry of States.

U.O.no.F.1-KS/49                                         D/14.4.49

Forwarded to Mr D.Kachru, Private Secretary to the Hon’ble Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Secretariat two copies of interview with UNCIP dated 12th April 1949 (one copy for Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad) with the compliments of Secretary for Kashmir Affairs.


As a result of discussions between Representatives of the Government of India on the one hand and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and its Truce Sub-Committee on the other, the Government of India have been invited to formulate their views on tree points.

(1) The Truce line in the North and North East of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, beyond Keran, upto which point agreement has already been reached in principle between the Representatives of India and Pakistan.

(2) Formation of a civil armed force for the maintenance of law and order in Azad Kashmir territory.

(3) The withdrawal of Indian forces from Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the relevant provisions of Part II of the Commission’s Resolution, dated the 19th August, 1948.

The government of India’s views on these three points are set out below seriatim.


1. A map indicating the line which the Government of India wish to see established is attached. It will be observed that no claim is made to the inclusion of Gilgit District within the Indian part of the line. What is claimed for inclusion within the Indian line is territory which strictly answers the description given in the Prime Minister’s letter, dated the 20th August, 1948, to Mr Korbel; it is territory over which the authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or, in some places like Skardu, which has been occupied by irregular or other Pakistan troops. After Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the region referred to, the responsibility for the administration of these areas will revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to the Government of India. It is not the intention to garrison these sparsely populated portions of the State of Jammu and Kashmir extensively. All that the Government of India propose to do is to maintain garrisons at selected points for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia.


2. The Pakistan Representatives who appeared before the Truce Sub-Committee had made certain recommendations in memorandum, dated the 9th March, which, as has already been pointed out to the Commission, were designed to achieve the objective of a “military balance between the forces on each side”. In the Secretary General’s letter to the Chairman, dated the 10th March, 1949, it was explained that the proposals in the memorandum regarding the strength, training and control of Azad Kashmir forces during the period of the truce would be (i) a preparation neither for peace nor a peaceful plebiscite but for the resumption of hostilities and (ii) contrary to the objective stated in para 3(1)© of the Prime Minister’s letter, dated the 20th August, 1948, and broadly accepted by the Commission, that nothing should be done which would enable the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops to be consolidated in any way during the period of the truce to the disadvantage of the State. The Government of India adhere to this view and re-affirm their request that action should be taken to disband and disarm the so-called Azad Kashmir forces. So long as these forces are not disbanded and disarmed, so long will it be necessary for the Government of India, in the interests of the security of the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under their control, to maintain a larger force than would otherwise be necessary. A force of 32 battalions, armed but without discipline, and inspired by fanaticism would obviously be a menace to the security of a territory which it covets and against whose Government its fanaticism is directed. That discipline would make this force militarily more manageable does not imply that it would also eliminate the fanaticism of its members. Indeed, the disciplining and reorganization proposed in the Pakistan memorandum would make this force a greater menace to the security of the rest of the State. Moreover, as was explained to Dr. Lozano during his visit to Delhi in December 1948, so long as a military force of this character is maintained in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory, there will be no security for those inhabitants who do not fully subscribe to or share the political views of pro-Pakistan elements and, therefore, no inducement to the re-entry into this territory of State citizens of this class who had left it on account of the present conflict. Disbandment and disarming of these forces is, therefore, essential both to the fulfilment, by the Government of India, of their obligations under B.1 and 2 of Part II of the Commission’s Resolution of the 13th August, and the creation, in the territory in question, of conditions which would ensure a free and impartial plebiscite.

For the maintenance of law and order in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory, a civil armed force has to be created. Before the outbreak of hostilities in the State, the total strength of the Police force maintained in this territory for the preservation of law and order has approximately 560 men of whom 256 were armed. The Government of India release that the physical and psychological conditions created by the conflict of the last 18 months necessitate a substantial augmentation of these numbers. They suggest, therefore, that a force of 2,500 persons, of which one half may be armed, be formed. This should be more than sufficient for the maintenance of law and order which must be the sole purpose of such a force.

Some of the considerations which have been urged in favour of disbanding and disarming the so-called Azad Kashmir force equally govern, in the opinion of the Government of India, the composition of the armed police force and its command. If the force is composed of, or officered by, followers of Azad Kashmir alone, the fear of insecurity amongst persons, both Muslims and non-Muslims, who do not belong to this category, whether they are already resident in this territory or are entitled to return to it, will persist. It is, therefore, suggested that to the extent of half its numbers, the force should be composed of nationals (Muslim and non-Muslim) of Jammu and Kashmir State who are or were normally resident in this area, but who do not follow the political creed of Azad Kashmir. The higher officers in command of this force should be neutrals and appointed by the Commission.


3. Part II of the Commission’s Resolution of the 13th August, 1948, recommends:

“B.1 When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2(of the Resolution) have withdrawn….., that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agree to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

B.2 Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease fire, those forces of its Army which, in agreement with the Commission, are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order…..”.

The Government of India accepted the Resolution of the 13th August, 1948, on the basis of clarifications furnished by the Commission which are explained in the Prime Minister’s letter to the then Chairman of the Commission, dated the 20th August, 1948. The portions of the Prime Minister’s letter which are relevant to the part of the Resolution quoted are Paragraph 3 Sub-paragraph 2 and the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 4. The Government of India re-affirm their adherence to the position set out in these communications.

The memorandum presented by the Pakistan Representatives to the Truce Sub-Committee of the Commission mentions three months as the period during which the withdrawal of Pakistan forces should be completed. This period seems to have been suggested with regard to the need for making suitable arrangements, inter alia, for the maintenance of law and order. Although, as explained in paragraph 2 of this memorandum, the Government of India are unable to

agree with certain basic assumptions and with proposals regarding the strength and training of the force needed to maintain law and order made in the Pakistan memorandum, they are willing to accept the period of three months for the completion of the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and for the creation of a civil armed force which will maintain law and order in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory. On this time basis, they suggest the following programme for the withdrawal of Indian forces.

Phase A. When Pakistan forces are being withdrawn and the Commission have notified the Government of India that the conditions mentioned in Part II B.1 of the Resolution of August 13th have been satisfied, the Government of India will begin to withdraw the equivalent of one division of infantry plus a proportion of supporting arms from Jammu and Kashmir State.

Phase B. By the end of one month of the termination of Phase A, two additional infantry brigades will be withdrawn. The composition and the strength of the forces left, at the end of this stage, will be as follows :

Division Headquarters   1

Line of Communication Area Headquarters          1

Brigade Headquarters    7

Light Armoured                1 plus

Regiments          1 squadron

Medium Armoured Regiment    1

Anti tank Batteries          2

Field Regiments                2

Light A.A. Batteries         1

Mountain Regiment       1

Mountain Batteries

State Forces       2

Post Groups RIA               3


Signal Regiments              2

Engineer Companies      10

Medium Machine

Gun Battalions  1

Indian Infantry Battalions             28

Phase C. Within two months of the end of Phase B, further withdrawal will be effected, at the end of which the Indian forces left in the State will consist of

One line of Communication area HA

One Infantry Division of four Brigades, each of four Battalions.

The fulfilment of the foregoing programme of withdrawal will be contingent upon:

(i) the complete withdrawal of Pakistan forces including ancillary forces and arms, equipment and stores;

(ii) the disbanding and disarming of the so-called Azad Kashmir forces and the creation of the Civil Armed Force mentioned in para 2 of this memorandum.

The phasing of the withdrawal of Pakistan forces has not been discussed in this memorandum. The Government of India will be prepared to instruct their Representatives to discuss this matter with the Commission, its Truce Sub-Committee and/or Pakistan Representatives if desired. The Commission will appreciate that, so far as their own programme of withdrawal is concerned, the Government of India are not willing to disclose it to the Government of Pakistan until a satisfactory agreement has been reached regarding the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and the replacement of the so-called Azad Kashmir forces by a civil armed force.

This memorandum is limited to a description, in broad outline, of the views of the Government of India on the three points which it deals, namely

(1) The Truce line.

(2) The formation of a civil armed force for the maintenance of law and order in Azad Kashmir territory.

(3) The withdrawal of Indian forces from Jammu and Kashmir.

The government of India will be happy to depute Representatives to discuss with the Commission the contents of the memorandum and to elucidate any parts of it that may need clarification or elaboration.


Record of conversation with Messrs, Lozano, Leguizamon and Delvoie (General), Military Adviser to NCIP, held on the

11th April 1949.

1. Mr Vishnu Sahay and I met Dr. Lozano (Columbia), Mr Leguizamon (Argentine) and Genl. Delvoie, Military Adviser to NCIP, yesterday. In accordance with the instructions of the Prime Minister which he gave me yesterday after discussion I gave the following replies to the Representatives of the Commission, to questions which they had raised on Thursday, the 7th.

(i) Truce line.

(a)  Upto Titwal. The Government of India were agreeable to this part of the truce line being fixed in agreement between the local commanders of the two armies. Where Pakistan had at one time agreed and subsequently retracted, the original agreement should be adhered to. Dr.Lozano enquired whether, in the event of local commanders disagreeing, General Delvoie could be authorized to arbitrate. I said that this point had not been put to me and that I must obtain the orders of Government.

(b) Beyond Titwal to the North and East in the thinly populated areas mentioned in the Prime Minister’s letter to Mr. Korbel, dated the 20th August. I said that the Govt. of India would agree in principle to holding points which were necessary

(1) for the protection of the territories held by us, especially in the valley, and

(2) for the command of trade routes.

Administration in and around the points held by us would naturally be under our control. We would not insist upon a continuous line.

(ii) Disbandment and disarming of ‘Azad Kashmir’ Forces. On this point, our stand was unaltered, namely that these forces must be disbanded and disarmed. Dr. Lozano said that Mr. Symonds had brought back word from Rawalpindi that the Government of Pakistan held that, according to the assurance given to them by the commission when the Resolution of the 13th August 1948 was being discussed, there could be no insistence on the disbanding and disarming of ‘Azad Kashmir’ forces during the truce period. I immediately countered that, since, strictly speaking, the whole period between the ‘cease-fire’ and the end of the plebiscite could only be described as the “truce period”, Pakistan’s contention, if conceded, would completely neutralize the Commission’s assurance to us that these forces would be disbanded and disarmed. Dr. Lozano said that the question of disbanding and disarming these forces had been discussed by him with us under 4(b) [P.8, Documents regarding Kashmir] of the proposals which were presented to me by the Commission on the 11th December, 1948. The Commission had suggested a period of three months during which both the withdrawal of Pakistan troops and the disbanding and disarming of “Azad Kashmir” forces should be completed in order to accelerate preparations for the plebiscite. They would still try to persuade the Government of Pakistan to agree to such an arrangement. We had, however, to reckon with the possibility of Pakistan insisting on a strict interpretation of 4(b) of the Commission’s Resolution of the 5th January, 1949, which reproduced, verbatim, the corresponding portion of the proposals presented by the Commission on the 11th December, 1948. According to news which Mr. Symonds had brought, Pakistan had proposed that there should be no mention of the disbanding and disarming of the ‘Azad Kashmir’ forces in the truce agreement but the question should be taken up under 4(b) when the Plebiscite Administrator arrived. Beyond informing Dr. Lozano and his colleagues that my instructions did not go beyond the acceptance of the three-month period suggested b the Commission, I made no comment.

(iii) Creating of a Civil Armed Force. I said that the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000 being raised for the maintenance of law and order. Half of this should be armed like a Police force and the other half unarmed. The personnel should to extent of half, be recruited from the followers of “Azad Kashmir” and the other half from persons normally resident in this area who were not followers of “Azad Kashmir”. No Pakistan officers should after the ‘truce period’ of three months, be associated with this force, which should be officered by U.N. personnel and by locals. General Delvoie said that Pakistan had originally proposed the retention of 32 battalions, 24 as armed units and 8 as lines of communication and administrative units. The gulf between what we proposed now and what Pakistan had asked for was still too wide. I said that, according to my understanding, Pakistan wanted, and the Commission seemed to agree, that some kind of an armed forces was necessary to occupy the truce line on the “Azad Kashmir” side. Such a force could not be regarded as a force designed for the maintenance of law and order but as a military force. Viewed as a proposal for the maintenance of law and order, ours represented a multiplication of the pre-conflict police force maintained in this area by eight. For the maintenance of a military force, we saw no need. On our side of the truce line will be such regular forces as we considered necessary for the dual purpose of ensuring the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order. Surely the Commission did not imagine that, having referred the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, having accepted the Commission’s two Resolutions, having submitted proposals for the reduction of our forces, we would seek to violate the truce line. Actually, by doing so, we should be damning ourselves in the eyes of the world; moreover, Pakistan, whose forces would be just on the other side of the State border, could rush in troops to check such a process. Militarily also, therefore, we would not be such fools as to attempt a violation of the truce line after having considerably reduced our military strength in Jammu and Kashmir. In this respect, the lines of communication of Pakistan and India had to be taken into account, and the advantage was overwhelmingly with Pakistan. Dr.Lozano and General Delvoie entirely agreed but said that they had to deal with the mentality of Azad Kashmir; it would be most difficult to persuade them that there would be no violation of the truce line by s. I said that I could not take into account suspicions and prejudices either of Pakistan or of ‘Azad Kashmir’. I could discuss proposals only on a basis of reason and faith in the sanctity of our pledged word.

(iv) Local authorities. I put to Dr. Lozano Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyanger’s suggestion that, for purposes of co-ordination, some Representative of the Commission (a neutral) be nominated and authority given to him for the discharge of his functions by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Dr. Lozano said that this would create an entirely new problem and was clearly of the view that our suggestion should not he pressed.

(v) Mr. Leguizamon asked whether we should agree to the Kishanganga being open for navigation to both ourselves and the other side for the transport of supplies etc. I said that I should have to refer the point to my Government.

2. Dr. Lozano, Mr. Leguizamon and General Delvoie are to fly today to Rawalpindi to convey to their colleagues of the Commission, who are already there, our reactions to the questions which they put to us on Thursday. They will leave at 3 p.m. today. They asked us to let them have a short note specifying our proposals. This is being done.

Sd/- G.S.Bajpai



Hon. Dy. P.M.

Hon. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

Copy to Mr. Vishnu Sahay.


Sandeep Bamzai